Justice as fairness provides what we want.
Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a whole species can be a great evil. The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the form of life of which animals are capable clearly impose duties of compassion and humanity in their case.
Ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think is most reasonable to enact.
There is a divergence between private and social accounting that the market fails to register. One essential task of law and government is to institute the necessary conditions.
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
I have tried to set forth a theory that enables us to understand and to assess these feelings about the primacy of justice. Justice as fairness is the outcome: it articulates these opinions and supports their general tendency.
The hazards of the generalized prisoner’s dilemma are removed by the match between the right and the good.
Clearly when the liberties are left unrestricted they collide with one another.
The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary.
We strive for the best we can attain within the scope the world allows.
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
There is no reason to suppose ahead of time that the principles satisfactory for the basic structure hold for all cases.
The other limitation on our discussion is that for the most part I examine the principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society. Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.
The refusal to take part in all war under any conditions is an unworldly view bound to remain a sectarian doctrine. It no more challenges the state’s authority than the celibacy of priests challenges the sanctity of marriage.
The significance of this special case is obvious and needs no explanation. It is natural to conjecture that once we have a sound theory for this case, the remaining problems of justice will prove more tractable in the light of it.
It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper.
The limitation of liberty is justified only when it is necessary for liberty itself, to prevent an invasion of freedom that would be still worse.
When parties and elections are financed not by public funds but by private contributions, the political forum is so constrained by the wishes of the dominant interests that the basic measures needed to establish just constitutional rule are seldom properly presented.
While the distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, it must be to everyone’s advantage, and at the same time, positions of authority and offices of command must be accessible to all.
Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.