The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
When the basic structure of society is publicly known to satisfy its principles for an extended period of time, those subject to these arrangements tend to develop a desire to act in accordance with these principles and to do their part in institutions which exemplify them.
The claims of existing social arrangements and of self interest have been duly allowed for. We cannot at the end count them a second time because we do not like the result.
The fundamental criterion for judging any procedure is the justice of its likely results.
It is of first importance that the military be subordinate to civilian government.
The strength of the claims of formal justice, of obedience to system, clearly depend upon the substantive justice of institutions and the possibilities of their reform.
The concept of justice I take to be defined, then, by the role of its principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an interpretation of this role.
An intuitionist conception of justice is, one might say, but half a conception.
Intuitionism is not constructive, perfectionism is unacceptable.
No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society.
If A were not allowed his better position, B would be even worse off than he is.
There are infinitely many variations of the initial situation and therefore no doubt indefinitely many theorems of moral geometry.
We may suppose that everyone has in himself the whole form of a moral conception.
Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a whole species can be a great evil. The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the form of life of which animals are capable clearly impose duties of compassion and humanity in their case.
Ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think is most reasonable to enact.
There is a divergence between private and social accounting that the market fails to register. One essential task of law and government is to institute the necessary conditions.
I have tried to set forth a theory that enables us to understand and to assess these feelings about the primacy of justice. Justice as fairness is the outcome: it articulates these opinions and supports their general tendency.
The hazards of the generalized prisoner’s dilemma are removed by the match between the right and the good.
Clearly when the liberties are left unrestricted they collide with one another.
The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary.